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ideas” (p. 113). Metulla, located north of Dan, was the only Jewish settlement that can be
said to have contributed in a significant way to defining the boundary’s final location. In the
end, it and more than a dozen Arab villages were strewn along the superimposed boundary,
with those lands divided between the two newly created states of Palestine and Lebanon.
The last of Palestine’s boundaries to be defined during this period was the eastern one,
along the Jordan River line. As in the south, the key decisions were all made by British
politicians and military leaders. In this case, the significance of General Allenby’s wartime
administrative divisions was not only reinforced locally by prevailing Ottoman practices but
also was supported in London by the earlier political decision to establish east of the Jordan
River a separate Arab state under British patronage. Although a few Zionist leaders, such
as Ze↩ev Jabotinsky, viewed as treasonous the failure of the Zionist Organization to expand
Palestine’s territory to the other bank of the Jordan River, Biger observes that once the British
demarcation was made, “no official Zionist demands concerning the location of the eastern
borderline were ever raised” (p. 179).
A final chapter highlighting the various partition plans that achieved prominence between
1937 and 1947 reminds the reader that British faith in the boundaries of the territorial unit
they had created did not last very long. However, as Biger notes, the eventual location of new
boundaries was determined mainly by military positions achieved after 1947. Biger’s argument
that such a discussion could not be encompassed within this book is well taken, but it raises
questions about why a discussion of the partition plans was considered within its scope in
the first place.
Other weaknesses range from the sentence to the conceptual level. An annoying number
of mistakes are made in the spelling of names (prominent among them being that of Archer
Cust, well known for his ideas of cantonization on the Swiss model). The book’s illustrations
mostly disappoint: the large photographs of political leaders are not especially relevant, and
the maps are neither as helpful nor as clear as one might expect for the subject matter.
Originally published in Hebrew, the book targets an audience interested mainly in the history
of Zionism. The Arabs of Palestine do not register. Biger’s explanation for this omission is
that Arabs “were not involved with the delimitation process of Palestine” (p. 229), yet the
fact that the Zionist Organization’s own “real influence was rather minor” (p. 226) does not
prevent him from elaborating throughout the book on its positions. It certainly would have
been worthwhile for Biger to have elaborated upon his observation of the local inhabitants
that “political delimitation with the aid of borderlines was an alien concept to them” (p. 229).
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Ben-Gurion, of course, helped to construct and shape the state of Israel, but his actions in
the arena of the Knesset, according to Giora Goldberg, led to unforeseen consequences in
later years. In the early years of the state, Ben-Gurion wielded tremendous power in party and
government as the architect of Labor Zionism and the decisive founder of Israel. Idiosyncrasies
were viewed instead within the realm of enigmatic wisdom. As the author comments, “Not
only was Ben-Gurion totally identified with the state he had established, he felt he owned it,
and passionately loved it” (p. 312). This paralleled the approach of leaders of other newly
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emergent nations. The emphasis on statism meant that any expression of independence and
individuality on the part of the Knesset members was viewed by Ben-Gurion as divisive and
counterproductive in the creation of a cohesive and united society. Israel was different from
the developing world, however, as Zionist politics had constructed a model that suggested all
wisdom did not reside within the executive arm. The Zionist congresses since 1897 and the
Asefat Hanivharim, the assembly of the Jewish settlers in Palestine, provided the background
experience for parliamentary opposition.
Ben-Gurion viewed the Knesset, the legislative arm, as a talking shop that should support
the government and refrain from criticizing it. Moreover, he preferred to blur the differences
between the executive and the legislative. However, when he understood that the Knesset
was not content to become a rubber stamp, he began to marginalize its position in political
life and to regard it almost as a rival. There was no attempt to achieve a balance of forces
between government and the executive, no checks and balances, only an apparent zero sum
game approach. Ben-Gurion’s campaign against the Knesset initially rendered it somewhat
docile and on the defensive such that not a single private member’s bill was proposed in the
first Knesset and only two enacted in the second.
In the early years, the continued existence of Israel was in the balance. Israel was “a
mobilized democracy” (p. 317). Its exposition of democratic behavior therefore projected
flaws. Israeli Arabs lived under military government, and some political parties, such as
the ultraorthodox, were highly selective about which parts of democracy they accepted and
which they rejected. In addition, the militant undergrounds of the early 1950s, such as Brit
HaCanaim, were quite happy to commit acts of violence against elected representatives. In
such circumstances, Ben-Gurion’s approach during these years was more akin to that of a
Kenyatta or Nyerere than his Knesset colleagues.
Ben-Gurion’s ardor for government by the executive led to ensuring that the Knesset foreign
affairs and security committees were left in the dark regarding decisions and developments
on the 1949 armistice agreements. When the Law and Justice Committee wished to meet
Ben-Gurion to discuss the Israeli constitution, the prime minister first refused to participate
and then cancelled meetings. He took the view that a constitution would ignite a kulturkampf
between secular and religious and was thereby detrimental to building a stable state. During his
sojourn in Sde Boker, when Moshe Sharett was prime minister, Ben-Gurion neither frequented
the Knesset nor refused his salary as an elected member. Goldberg notes that Ben-Gurion was
also averse to granting Knesset members a broad immunity from prosecution, as is the case in
many other democracies. Goldberg argues that they pushed the immunity bill through because
they simply did not trust Ben-Gurion.
Perhaps one of the more interesting sections in this well-researched book is Ben-Gurion’s
interventionist approach when it came to his own and other parties. During the first and
second Knesset elections, Ben-Gurion was highly influential as to who should be placed on
the Mapai list of candidates. In the 1949 election, Yitzhak Ben-Zvi was given a high-ranking
position; seven seats were reserved for women and six for kibbutzim and moshavim. However,
Ben-Gurion rejected a proposal in which lawyers—who knew a little about making laws—
would be favored. Goldberg suggests that such a move would have enhanced the legislative
ability of the Knesset. Most Mapai members went along with Ben-Gurion, but one member
of its central committee commented, “I have seen the Knesset choose a government, but I
have never seen the government choose the Knesset” (p. 210). Ben-Gurion was also happy
to aid his party’s chances by obtaining information about the preparations for Herut’s first
conference from the security services. In addition, members’ correspondence was monitored,
and scheduled radio broadcasts were withdrawn. A poem by Natan Alterman lauding the
Palmach—the fighting force of the rival Ahdut Ha↩avoda—was prevented by the censor from
being published in Davar.
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Goldberg argues that Ben-Gurion was responsible in part for the unruly style of Knesset
debates in that he did not set an example for his colleagues. His provocative language often
led to unparliamentary scenes. In the case of Menachem Begin and his followers in Herut,
he employed this to good effect with a studied display of bile and sarcasm. Irritated and
nonplussed, Begin always responded in kind and thereby propagated the imagery in the public
mind of Herut as “extremist.” As Ben-Gurion envisaged, this probably retarded the coalescence
of the right in Israeli politics by many years and tarnished Begin’s repeated attempts at
respectability.
As Israel’s future became more certain, parliamentarians both inside and outside his party
were unwilling to accept Ben-Gurion’s actions in reverential silence. This can be observed
by the increase of the number of private members’ bills passed. By 1960, when he declared,
“I have dismissed the government,” Ben-Gurion’s rationalized authoritarianism provoked an
alliance that cut through party lines.
This interesting book does not explain why Ben-Gurion embarked upon this path and also
omits any ideological rationale. Ben-Gurion, the self-assured politician and state builder, was
also the arch pragmatist. In this area, he learned much from the operational style of Lenin
and the Bolsheviks and opposed Moshe Sneh’s Communists and the ideologically moonstruck
pro-Soviet Mapam. Even so, this is an important contribution to comprehending Israel’s first
decade.
PAUL SCHAM, WALID SALEM, AND BENJAMIN POGRUND, EDS., Shared Histories: A Palestinian–
Israeli Dialogue (Walnut Creek, Calif.: Left Coast Press, 2005). Pp. 304. $59.00 cloth,
$23.95 paper.
REVIEWED BY REBECCA LUNA STEIN, Department of Cultural Anthropology, Duke University,
Durham, N.C.; e-mail: rlstein@duke.edu
DOI: 10.1017/S0020743807080257
During the course of the negotiations that would culminate in the Declaration of Principles
(DOP), or the Oslo Accords, historical narratives were effectively barred from the negotiating
table. “History,” as Paul Scham argues elsewhere, “was considered too hot to handle.”1 As
a result, the so-called “mutual recognition” codified in the DOP was enormously limited.
Although it addressed the political future of the negotiating process, however contingently, the
past was not afforded equal attention—a critical blind spot in the substance of “recognition”
that led to successive failures in subsequent negotiations over the status of Jerusalem and
Palestinian refugees.
Shared Histories: A Palestinian–Israeli Dialogue returns us to the terrain of history. The
editors argue that counter to the “conventional logic of peace-making,” a mutual understanding
of the historical narratives on which Israelis and Palestinians stake their respective political
claims is a sine qua non of conflict resolution. This is not a call for historical consensus.
Rather, it is an attempt to foreground the narrative discontinuities and historical disagreements
on which politics is built. Although this is not a text grounded in political pragmatics, peace-
making is its explicit horizon. In their introduction, the editors argue that an appreciation of
the stakes in history and a mutual understanding of the divergent ways that Israelis and Pales-
tinians tell their own pasts will advance peace building, that now elusive project. Originally
conceived in 1999—prior to the failures at Camp David, the outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada,
and the election of Prime Minster Ariel Sharon—the volume emerged from what now seems,
in retrospect, a much more hopeful time.
